

GENERATIONAL COHORTS AND THE SHAPING OF POPULAR ATTITUDES TOWARDS THE HOLOCAUST

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IN COMMON parlance with regard to survivors of the Holocaust we often speak of 'generations', with a term such as 'second generation survivor' denoting the children of people who survived the Holocaust. Discussions of education about the Holocaust since the 1990s focus increasingly on what is termed the 'third generation'. These are very rough terms at best, since a child of survivors might have been born in war-torn Europe in the late 1940s, or in more prosperous circumstances a decade or more later, often in Israel or the United States. Survivors of the Holocaust who were themselves children or teens in the early 1940s might not have had children until well into the 1960s. Given the different age-typical ways the wide age-range of survivor parents experienced the Holocaust, and the very different cultural climates in which their children learned of their parents' experiences, we might expect that more precise attention to years of birth of the various generations would better enable us to discern their common traits.

This paper is an attempt to outline a theory that links defining experiences for whole age cohorts of people first with the life outlook of those cohorts, and then with the life outlooks and attitudes of their children. I have attempted this not for Holocaust survivors, but for 'ordinary Germans' who came of age in the first half of the 20th century, and their children who came of age in the second half. Thus my observations are relevant for the bystanders and (potential) perpetrators of trauma, not for its victims. In the context of Holocaust education today, this is the relevant target group.

Many historians and sociologists have observed that crucial experiences between the ages of 16 and 26, in certain circumstances from 14 to 30, are critical in shaping lifetime political attitudes.¹ Momentous historical events such as wars and economic crises may overshadow more personally important events in individuals' lives, thus affecting the political attitudes of a large proportion of the people in the crucial age range at that time.² I will refer to these event-defined groups as 'age cohorts'. The term 'generation' is often used in common parlance, but I wish to reserve it for the groups of children of event-defined cohorts, whose political attitudes, in the absence of an epochal historical experience, are shaped more by their mediated relationship to their parents' experience.³ Thus we will have political *cohorts* shaped by Nazi-era events, and political *generations* who came of age in the 1950s and 1960s, when important events were more diffuse than the epochal turning points their parents experienced.

Although I will extend this theory back to the World War I conjuncture, let us begin with a look at Germans who came of age in 1930s and 1940s. Widely experienced epochal turning points might have been the formation of the Nazi state in 1933-34, and the tangible turning point in the war in 1943. The cohorts affected by these events would have been born between approximately 1904 (age 26 in 1930, when Nazism's popularity

began to skyrocket) and 1927 (age 16 in 1943, when combat duty began to mean probable death).

Let us take the midpoint of 1915-16 as the transition between these two experiential cohorts (these dates are somewhat arbitrary and must be confirmed on actual cases). The older group (born ca.1904-1915) would have had children born ca.1926-1937, who would have been shaped by events after 1943, such as the end of World War II, the beginning of the Cold War, and the economic recovery after the currency reform of 1948. The group born between 1916 and 1926 would have had children beginning roughly in 1937 (when its oldest members were 21), and trailing off by the mid-1950s.

Before we examine concrete cases, I would like to introduce a terminology that will help to keep track the various cohorts and generations. For the following discussion (summarized in Table 1), it is important to note that the dates of the birth years are approximate, depending as they do on the eccentricities of individual biography. The biographies of the people in the 'examples' column help to draw the dividing lines, but even some of these cases show attitudes characteristic of both groups.

The first politically relevant cohort in the 20th century, which I will call the 1918ers, is important in this context only inasmuch as its members created the pivotal event that set the whole dynamic to be outlined here in motion: the Nazi accession to unprecedented political and cultural power since 1930. This cohort, born at the end of the 19th century (ca.1890-1902), contributed most of *Nazism's founding fathers*, such as Hitler, Himmler, Göring, and Goebbels.⁴ The political attitudes of these activist visionaries were shaped during their politically formative years by the German defeat in World War I, which they understood as betrayal by the revolutionaries of 1918. Further, the 'shameful injustice' of the Versailles Treaty branded their consciousness.⁵ Those who came to support the Nazi party never felt comfortable with the democratic government that signed that treaty. This cohort included, to name a few examples, Hitler (h.1889), Göring (b.1893), Rudolf Hess (b.1894), Josef Goebbels (h.1897), Martin Bormann (b.1900), Hans Frank (b.1900), and Heinrich Himmler (b.1900).

Given the close succession of formative events in first half of the century in Germany, new cohorts emerged every 10-15 years. Given the usual child-bearing age of 20-30, the succeeding (postwar) generations tend to emerge after every second cohort.

The next cohort, the *1933ers* or *careerist Nazi cohort*, was born roughly from 1901 to 1914.⁶ Recent German authors refer to this cohort as the *Tätergeneration* – the generation of perpetrators.⁷ The members of this cohort had neither developed loyalty to the pre-World War I monarchy, nor to the German republic of the 1920s. For many of them, Hitler's assumption of power in 1933 was a vindication of Germany's national pride. They immediately took the opportunity make careers building and consolidating his state. Examples include Leni Riefenstahl (b.1902), Werner Best (b.1903), Reinhard Heydrich (b.1904), Theodor Oberländer (b.1905), Albert Speer (b.1905), Adolf Eichmann (b.1906), Baldur von Schirach (b.1907), and Hans Filbinger (b.1913). Rudolf Höss (b.1900) is an example who exhibits elements of both the founding and careerist Nazi cohorts.

The cohort born between 1915 and 1925 also contributed to the 'generation of perpetrators', but this age group did not have the opportunity to rise to the prominence of the above examples during the Nazi period. Their experience of the elation of the prewar Nazi years was overshadowed by the hopelessness of the situation after 1943, symbolized by the defeat of the German Sixth Army at Stalingrad. Thus I refer to them as *1943ers*.⁸ These 1943ers staffed the offices, schools, and institutions – including the army and concentration camps – of the Nazi Reich during Nazism's stable phase after

Table 1 German Political Cohorts, 1890–1976

Birth Years (approx.)	pivotal events ages 16–26 or parental attitudes during that shaped political behavior	Shorthand name; descriptive names	Examples (birthdate)
1890–1902	1916–1919: World War I experienced as a profound, disorienting rupture; no loyalty to postwar state	1918ers (includes the founders of Nazism); generation of 1914.	Hitler (1889) Göring (1893) Goebbels (1897) Himmler (1900)
1903–1915	1920–1938: formed no strong relationship to Weimar Republic; experienced Nazism as a positive turning point.	1933ers careerist Nazis reviled generation, generation of the perpetrators (parents of 1948ers)	Oberländer (1905) Speer (1905) Eichmann (1906) Filbinger (1913) F.J. Strauss (1915)
1916–1925	1939–1943: grew up under Nazism, fought for it during World War II; experienced both elation and devastation of war; most decimated by war	1943ers World War II cohort; younger careerist Nazis; Stalingraders; deceived generation (parents of 1968ers)	M. Maschmann (1918) H. Schmidt (1918) R.v. Weizsäcker (1920)
1926–1936	1944–1957 (currency reform): end of Nazism in 1945, economic upturn after 1948 and ‘economic miracle’ of 50s	1948ers 1945ers; skeptical, Hitler Youth, betrayed, white, reconstruction generation	M. Broszat (1926) G. Tempel (1926) W. Scheffler (1929) H. Kohl (1930)
1937–1953	1958–1969: 1943er parents’ failure to admit Nazi past in early 60s; Vietnam War, political weakness of democratic political system	1968ers first postwar generation (children of 1943ers)	Niklas Frank (1939) U. Hegi (b.1939) B. Klarsfeld (1939) S. Reichel (1946), G.v. Arnim (1946)
1954–1966	1970–1980 (Holocaust film): interest in Nazi background of 1933er grandparents; grew up under more historically open Brandt and Schmidt governments of 1969–1982	1979ers Alltagshistoriker (began to research Nazi history in 1980s); second postwar generation; (children of 1948ers, grandchildren of 1933ers)	Norbert Frei (1955) M. Brenner (1958) A. Rosmus (1960) M. Heyl (1965)
1967–1976	1983–1993 (post-Bitburg): learned of Nazi past through media and school; no close relationships with 1933ers	1989ers (1990ers) third postwar cohort; (children of 1968ers)	

1935. This cohort was also the most decimated in World War II. At the end of the war many of its members were able to distance themselves from Nazism.⁹ The budding Nazi careers of older members such as Franz Josef Strauss (b.1915) and pollster Elizabeth Noelle-Neumann (b.1916) were suddenly cut off in 1945, but they were able to re-establish themselves as solid democrats.¹⁰ They were young enough to have had only limited complicity in constructing the Nazi regime, even if their work for Nazism had left its stamp, positively or negatively, on their values.

Richard von Weizsäcker (b.1920) is an example from this cohort who overcame his incipient Nazi complicity.¹¹ (Weizsäcker, who defended his converted Nazi father Ernst at Nuremberg in 1947, later became one of West Germany’s most honest, open and respected democrats.¹²) Irma Greese (b.1921), a notorious Auschwitz and Belsen guard, is an example of a younger woman in this group who was so complicit (and intellectually limited) that she never renounced her allegiance to Nazism.¹³

The next cohort, which I will call the *1948ers*, was born from the mid-1920s to the late 1930s (ca.1926 to 1936). These individuals grew up within the Nazi system, but consciously experienced only that system’s depravity, which could no longer be ignored after 1943.¹⁴ These Germans were young enough so that any positive experiences of Nazism’s best years prior to 1942–43 was overshadowed by their own conscious experience of the devastating phase of the war and its aftermath. They were not complicit, even by apathy or inaction, in Nazi crimes. In a phrase made memorable by West German chancellor Helmut Kohl (b.1930) in 1984, this cohort was thus blessed by the ‘grace of late birth’.¹⁵ Although they were thoroughly disabused of any positive attitudes towards Nazism, they had still worn the uniforms of the Hitler Youth and the League of German Girls (membership was compulsory after 1936), some had served in combat, and they were educated by careerist Nazi teachers right into the 1950s. This created a dissonance within each individual biography, an ambivalence between understanding for those who had been complicit in Nazism, and rejection of all that Nazism stood for.¹⁶

While other scholars call this cohort the ‘1945ers’, I prefer to refer to them as *1948ers*, since the currency reform of 1948 and Marshall Plan aid gave them their first positive political orientation, as opposed to the total disorientation in 1945.¹⁷ For some, their unhesitating embrace of the new democratic state prevented them from recognizing its flaws.¹⁸ For instance, many harbored fears of non-institutional politics, and thus overlooked the state’s attempts to repress grass-roots activism. The first German historians to investigate brown-collar crimes belong to this cohort – for example Martin Broszat (1926–1989) and Wolfgang Scheffler (b.1929).¹⁹ In the early 1960s members of this cohort initiated an implicit challenge to the public silence about Germany’s Nazi past. Authors such as Siegfried Lenz (b.1926), Günther Grass (b.1927) and Martin Walser (b.1927), whose writings attempted to force a public engagement with the Nazi past, are also *1948ers*.²⁰

The next group, the *1968ers*, is best defined as a generation, not a cohort. They were the first not to have consciously experienced 1948 as a defining moment for the future. Instead, this group came of age in the prosperous years of the late 1950s and early 1960s. This first postwar generation was born from the late 1930s to the early 1950s (ca.1937 to 1953).²¹ In rebellions culminating in the watershed year 1968, some members of this generation stridently rebelled against their presumptively complicit 1943er parents. On the other hand, other members of this generation aligned themselves with the conventional obedience-and-order mentality of their Nazi-socialized parents and boosted the neo-Nazi party NPD into several state parliaments in the late 1960s. The political attitudes of most members of this postwar generation lay somewhere in between these extremes, but as individual biographies show, their confrontation with their parents’

Nazi past decisively influenced their identity. This first postwar generation is commonly referred to as the 1968ers, because the anti-establishment movement culminating that year left a lasting stamp on their political attitudes, positively or negatively.

In 1964 the returned German-Jewish emigré philosopher Günther Anders coined the phrase 'we children of Eichmann' to express the 68er generation's legacy of upbringing by 1933ers.²² The 1968ers did not begin to articulate this themselves until the late 1970s and early 1980s.²³ In 1979 a number of important literary works dealing with the conflict between the 1968ers and the 1933ers were published.²⁴ They include: Sigfrid Gauch (b.1945), *Vaterspuren* (Königstein: Athenäum, 1979, 1990, 1997); Peter Härtling (b.1933), *Nachgetragene Liebe* (Darmstadt: Luchterhand, 1980, 1982), Paul Kersten (b.1943), *Der alltägliche Tod meines Vaters* (Cologne: Kiepenhauer & Witsch, 1978); Christoph Meckel (b.1935), *Suchbild: Über meinen Vater* (Düsseldorf: Claassen, 1980); Ernst Rauter, *Brief an meine Erzieher* (Munich: Weismann, 1979, 1980); Ruth Rehmann (b.1922), *Der Mann auf der Kanzel: Fragen an einen Vater* (Munich: Hanser, 1979); *The Man in the Pulpit* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska, 1997); Brigitte Schwaiger (b.1949), *Lange Abwesenheit* (Hamburg: Zsolnay, 1980; Rowohlt, 1982); Bernward Vesper (1938–1971), *Die Reise* (Frankfurt: Zweitausendeins, 1979); and Heinrich Wiesner (b.1925), *Der Riese am Tisch* (Basel: Lenos, 1979).

This first round of literary publications was followed by a more explicit and analytical second round in the 1980s. It includes works such as: Dörte von Westernhagen (b.1943), *Die Kinder der Täter: Das Dritte Reich und die Generation danach* (Munich: Kösel, 1987); Niklas Frank (b.1939), *Der Vater: Eine Abrechnung* (Munich: Bertelsmann, 1987),²⁵ and Gabriele von Arnim (b.1943), *Das grosse Schweigen* (Munich: Kindler, 1989).²⁶

Other members of this first postwar generation, who had left Germany for the United States in the 1950s and 1960s, published their record of dealing with their parents' legacy somewhat later in the 1980s and into the 1990s. German-American writers Sabine Reichel (b.1946, *What did you do in the War, Daddy?*, 1989), Ursula Duba-Ross, *Talks from a Child of the Enemy*, 1995), and Ursula Hegi (b.1939, *Teaching the Silence*, 1997) are examples of emigrés of this generation who dealt with their parental cohort's past.²⁷

The attitudes of these 1968ers can be characterized as follows: they felt that they had somehow been victimized by the silence of their 1943er parents, and they were determined to teach about it themselves. They also identified strongly with the victims of Holocaust and showed great solidarity with oppressed peoples in the third world (for instance, during the Vietnam War, but also with the Palestinians once Israel had won the June 1967 Six-Day War). The left-wing terrorists of the Red Army Faction during the 1970s are the most extreme and notorious examples of this behaviour, but many showed more moderate, if still obsessive behaviours as well. TV talk show hostess Lea Rosh (b.1937) would be another example. Rosh participated in the propagation of information about Nazism's crimes by narrating a nationally televised documentary series entitled 'Death is a Master from Germany'.²⁸ In 1987 she started a private initiative to establish a national German memorial 'for the murdered Jews of Europe' in Berlin.²⁹ Rosh had changed her name from Edith Rosh to express the Jewish identity she felt (one of her grandparents had been Jewish). Bernhard Schlink (b.1944), author of the best-selling semi-autobiographical novel *The Reader* (1995), is another example.³⁰

The next generation to emerge was what I will call the 1979ers. The name derives from the year of the first German broadcast of the TV miniseries *Holocaust*, although, in contrast to the events defining the cohorts in the first half of the century, that 'event' was as much a result of a common attitude, as it was a cause. Rather, this second postwar

generation, born between about 1954 and 1966, had only remotely mediated experience of the Nazi era. Its parents were mostly 1948ers, who had never confronted their 1933er parents about the Nazi past, and now basically kept silent about their childhood experiences. When the 1979er children began to ask questions of their aging 1933er grandparents, however, this older generation began to speak, more or less candidly, about the Nazi past. Yielding to their own desire to make sense of their own lives and pass them on to posterity before passing on themselves, they were much more willing to talk to the relatively naive 1979ers in the late 1970s and early 1980s than they had been in earlier decades, especially in the confrontational climate created by the accusatorial 1968ers during that decade.

Mentored by 1948er professors and guided by 1968er schoolteachers (who had mellowed during what left-wing 1968er leader Rudi Dutschke [1940–1979] had called the 'long march through the institutions'), these 1979ers supplied the footsoldiers of the German version of the international history workshop movement, known as *Alltagsgeschichte*. Beginning in 1980 and in part prompted by the interest in the TV miniseries *Holocaust*, the presidential competition for the best high school history essay focused on life under Nazism.³¹

Anna Rosmus (b.1960), about whom Michael Verhoeven's film *Nasty Girl* was made in 1989, is perhaps the best-known representative of this generation.³² While researching the history of anti-Nazi resistance in Passau for the history essay competition, she discovered many of the town's leading citizens had not been the anti-Nazis they claimed to have been. Although some 1933ers were willing to talk to her, others, once they realized she was finding out the real background to their stories, quickly reversed their openness. Rosmus was denied access to documents, defamed, sued and denounced. Ultimately, her study was published in 1984 with a preface by one of the justices of the West German supreme court. That same year she received the prestigious 'Scholl Siblings Prize' in memory of the Munich student resisters, and in 1987 Kurt Tucholsky's widow bequeathed a death mask of the famous author to her in recognition of her steadfastness. Rosmus went on to write several other historical books about Passau's Nazi past before leaving for Boston University to write a dissertation with Elie Wiesel on the history of the Jews in Passau.³³ She continued to raise a great deal of local ire by unearthing the unsavory past activities of her fellow townfolk. One doctor successfully sued her in a local court to remove information about him from her 1993 book about the treatment of pregnant slave labourers in the town – even though he could not disprove her allegations.³⁴

Michael Brenner (b.1964), whose case study of Jewish life in the town of Weiden during the Nazi period won a first prize in the 1982–83 essay competition, went on to become an acclaimed historian.³⁵ Brenner lectured at Brandeis University, and, when he accepted the University of Munich's brand new chair in Jewish History and Culture in 1997, became one of the youngest full professors in the country.³⁶ His institute at the University of Munich has rapidly become a center for research and education about German-Jewish history.³⁷ Brenner's success is just one example of the mushrooming German interest in learning about its eradicated Jewish culture. Whereas in the two decades prior to 1984 about 270 German studies of Jewish communities had been published, by 1990 about 1700 more had appeared – a twentyfold increase in average annual output!³⁸

In the 1980s there were several vitriolic conflicts over what West German historian Norbert Frei (b.1955), himself a 1979er, has called the 'politics of the past'. These included the discussion of the TV film epic *Heimat* (1984), which was produced as a

response to the Holocaust miniseries;³⁹ the controversy over US president Reagan's visit to the Bitburg cemetery with Chancellor Helmut Kohl in 1985;⁴⁰ the so-called 'Historians' Debate' of 1986ff;⁴¹ and the commemoration of Kristallnacht in November 1988, which included the resignation of the West German parliamentary president Jenninger.⁴² These controversial public events can be interpreted as a split between members of the 1948er cohort over whether they should ally backwards with their 1933er parents, or forwards with the younger 1968er generation.

During and since the 1990s, the 1948ers began to leave the political arena, with 1968ers to replace them. This is symbolized at the top level of politics with the election of Gerhard Schröder (b.1944) to replace Helmut Kohl (b.1930). At the same time, 1979ers are acceding to positions in the cultural elite. Another generation, which I will call the 1989ers, has begun their formative political years. Their attitudes towards the Nazi era will have been shaped by events of the 1990s, such as the German release of the film 'Schindler's List' in 1993,⁴³ the nationally televised and widely discussed reception of Daniel Goldhagen's book *Hitler's Willing Executioners* in 1996,⁴⁴ the creation of a national Holocaust remembrance day that same year,⁴⁵ and the controversy surrounding the 1995 exhibition 'Crimes of the German Army', which began in 1997.⁴⁶ When we design Holocaust curricula in the year 2000, we should keep in mind that our audience has moved beyond simple victim identification, and wants and needs to learn about the perpetrators: How they came to be as they were and do what they did.

NOTES

- 1 Karl Mannheim is the seminal theorist on this issue. See especially his 1927 essay 'The Sociological Problem of Generations' in Paul Kecskemeti (ed.), *Karl Mannheim: Essays on the Sociology of Knowledge* (London: Routledge, 1952, 1972), 276-320.
- 2 For discussions of how age cohorts are shaped by pivotal experiences, see Hans Jaeger, 'Generationen in der Geschichte: Überlegungen zu einer umstrittenen Konzeption', *Geschichte und Gesellschaft* 3(1977), 429ff.; Heinz Bude, 'Die Erinnerung der Generationen', in: Helmut König, Michael Kohlstruck and Andreas Wöll (eds.), *Vergangenheitsbewältigung am Ende des zwanzigsten Jahrhunderts* (Opladen: Westdeutscher, 1998), 69-85; Norbert Frei, 'Farewell to the Era of Contemporaries: National Socialism and its Historical Examination en route into History', in: Gulie Ne'eman Arad (ed.), *Passing into History: Nazism and the Holocaust beyond Memory: In Honor of Saul Friedlander on his Sixty-fifth Birthday* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1997) (*History & Memory* 9:1/2 [Fall 1997]), 59-79; Kristin Platt and Mibran Dabag, *Generation und Gedächtnis: Erinnerungen und kollektive Identitäten* (Opladen: Leske & Budrich, 1995).
- 3 I am indebted to A.D. Moses for his incisive and insightful comments on the question of cohorts, especially with regard to the group that I call the 48ers.
- 4 Note that this does not follow Mannheim's distinction between 'generation' and 'cohort.' For a discussion of Mannheim's thoughts on the two terms, see: Peter Loewenberg, 'The Psychohistorical Origins of the Nazi Youth Cohort', *AHR* 76:5 (Dec. 1971), 1457-1502, 1465. For an excellent discussion of the literature in general, see Helmut Fogt, *Politische Generationen: Empirische Bedeutung und theoretisches Modell* (Opladen: Westdeutscher, 1982), 6-25.
- 5 In 1934 Columbia University sociology professor Theodore Abel conducted an essay competition for 'the best personal life history of an adherent of the Hitler movement.' Close to 70% of the 683 Nazis who responded were born between 1895 and 1916. For an excellent analysis of this material, see Peter Merk, *Political Violence under the Swastika: 581 Early Nazis* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975).
- 6 For a sophisticated five-country examination of the 1918er cohort, see Robert Wohl, *The Generation of 1914* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard, 1979). See pp.239f for references to the literature.
- 7 For a detailed discussion of seminal experiences of the cohort born between 1900 and 1915, see Loewenberg, 'The Psychohistorical Origins of the Nazi Youth Cohort', passim. The experiences are

diagrammatically illustrated on p.1462. See also Ulrich Herbert's discussion of this cohort, including an examination of contemporary 1930s literature that discerned the phenomenon, in his: *Arbeit, Volkstum, Weltanschauung: Über Fremde und Deutsche im 20. Jahrhundert* (Frankfurt: Fischer, 1995), 31-58, with bibliographic notes on p.234. For the most detailed intellectual biography of a member of this cohort, see Herbert's *Best: Biographische Studien über Radikalismus, Weltanschauung und Vernunft, 1903-1989* (Bonn: Dietz, 1996). Johannes Steinhoff, Peter Bechel and Dennis Showalter (eds.), *Voices from the Third Reich: An Oral History* (New York: Da Capo, 1994 [1989]) offers a collection of 157 interviews, the vast majority taken from people with birth years between 1909 and 1925.

- 7 See Gesine Schwan, *Politik und Schuld: Die zerstörerische Macht des Schweigens* (Frankfurt: Fischer, 1997), 133, 147. Schwan uses the cutoff date 1925. As an example of the common use of the term, see Jürgen Habermas, 'Der Zeigefinger: Die Deutschen und ihr Denkmal', *Zeit* 31 March, 1999. The term *Tätergeneration*, while accurate, contains a collective reproach that belies its coining by 1968ers. I prefer the term 'careerist Nazis' because it characterizes the activity of this cohort more neutrally without branding everyone as criminally guilty.
- 8 For concise biographical interviews with numerous 1943ers, see Henry Ries, *Abschied meiner Generation* (Berlin: Argon, 1992) (37 interviews range from birth years 1899 to 1924, with most between 1917 and 1924); also Karl Heinz Jahnke, *Hitlers letztes Aufgebot: Deutsche Jugend im sechsten Kriegsjahr 1944/45* (Essen: Klartext, 1993); Ludwig Marcuse (ed.), *War ich ein Nazi? Politik - Anfechtung des Gewissens* (Munich: Rütten & Loening, 1968) (nine authors whose birth years range from 1903 to 1922). On women, see Trude Unruh, *Trummerfrauen: Biografien einer betrogenen Generation* (Essen: Klartext, 1987).
- 9 For typical 'victim's' perspectives: Siegfried Knappe (b.1916) and Ted Brusaw, *Soldat: Reflections of a German Soldier, 1936-1949* (New York, Orion, 1992); Heinz Edler, *Die missbrauchte Generation: Erlebnisse, Erfahrungen, Erkenntnisse eines Unbekannten aus sechs Jahrzehnten* (Frankfurt: R.G. Fischer, 1989); G.R. Karl Rammelt, *Die Geschollenen: Die Generation zwischen 1918 und 1933* (Leoni: Druffel, 1992); also see *Die Generationen: Ein Gespräch mit dem ehemaligen Lagerkreis REWIDA*, 1996.
- 9 This is especially evident in the examples collected in Steinhoff, Bechel, Showalter, *Voices*.
- 10 On Strauss see: Bernt Engelmann, *Das neue Schwarzbuch: Franz Josef Strauss* (Cologne: Kiepenhauer & Witsch, 1980). Strauss never contested Engelmann's portrayal. See also Joachim Schoeps, *Die Spiegelaffäre des Franz Josef Strauss* (Hamburg: Rowohlt, 1983), 27-42.
- 11 On Noelle-Neumann's Nazi-era career see: Christopher Shea, 'Nazi Apologist or Distinguished Scholar?' *Chronicle of Higher Education* 8 August 1997.
- 11 See, for example, Hans Filbinger, *Die geschmähte Generation* (Munich: Universitas, 1987), especially 167 for remarks on this cohort.
- 12 See Ian Buruma, *Wages of Guilt*, 142ff; Helmut Dubiel, 'Niemand ist frei von der Geschichte' (Munich: Hanser, 1999); also the brief autobiographical sketch: Richard von Weizsäcker, 'Nobody Could Foresee the Horrors', *Newsweek* (international ed.), 15 March, 1999.
- 13 See also the biography of the concentration camp guard Anna Fest (b.1920) in: Alison Owings, *Frauen: German Women Recall the Third Reich* (New Brunswick: Rutgers, 1993), 313-41. See also Melita Maschmann (b.1918), *Account Rendered* (London: Abelard-Schuman, 1964).
- 14 For examples and discussions of this cohort, see Alfons Heck (b.1928), *The Burden of Hitler's Legacy* (Frederick, CO: Renaissance House, 1988); Rolf Schörken, *Jugend 1945: Politisches Denken und Lebensgeschichte* (Opladen: Leske + Budrich, 1990; Frankfurt: Fischer, 1994); Gabriele Rosenthal and Claudia Gather, *Die Hitlerjugend-Generation: Biographische Thematisierung als Vergangenheitsbewältigung* (Essen: Blaue Eule, 1986); Heinz Bude, *Deutsche Karrieren: Lebenskonstruktionen sozialer Aufsteiger aus der Flakhelfer-Generation* (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1987); Friedhelm Boll, 'Hitler-Jugend und "skeptische Generation": Sozialdemokratie und Jugend nach 1945', in Dieter Dowe (ed.), *Partei und soziale Bewegung: Kritische Beiträge zur Entwicklung der SPD seit 1945* (Bonn: Dietz, 1993), 33-58.
- 15 The phrase may actually have first been used by Günter Gaus.
- 16 An excellent example of this ambivalence can be found in the 1997-98 revelation that 1933er historians Werner Conze (b.1910) and Theodor Schieder (b.1904) were heavily complicit in producing historical justification for Nazi policies. Their 1948er students during the 1950s, for example

- Reconciliation with Nazi Era', *NYT* 24 Apr. 1985, and Dagmar Stern, 'A German History Lesson: Edgar Reitz's, *Heimat*', *Film and History* 17:1(1987), 9ff.
- 40 See Geoffrey Hartmann (ed.), *Bitburg in Moral and Political Perspective* (Bloomington: Indiana Univ. Press, 1986), and Ilya Levkov (ed.) *Bitburg and Beyond: Encounters in American, German and Jewish History* (New York: Shapolsky, 1987). In German: Werner Bergmann, 'Die Bitburg-Affäre in der deutschen Presse. Rechtskonservative und linksliberale Interpretationen', in Bergmann/Erb/Lichtblau (eds.) *Schwieriges Erbe* (Frankfurt: Campus, 1995), 408-28; also Bergmann, *Antisemitismus in öffentlichen Konflikten* (Frankfurt: Campus, 1998), 419-24.
- 41 Even the English language literature on this debate is voluminous. See: Charles Maier, *The Unmasterable Past: History, Holocaust, and German National Identity* (Cambridge: Harvard, 1988). Richard Evans, *In Hitler's Shadow: West German Historians and the Attempt to Escape from the Nazi Past* (New York: Pantheon, 1989) offers a monographic interpretation; Peter Baldwin (ed.), *Reworking the Past: Hitler, the Holocaust, and the Historians' Debate* (Boston: Beacon, 1990) a collection of interpretative essays.
- 42 See: Armin Laschet and Heinz Malangré (eds.), *Philipp Jenninger: Rede und Reaktion* (Koblenz: Rheinischer Merkur, 1989), and Lutz Niethammer, 'Jenninger: Vorzeitiges Exposé zur Erforschung eines ungewöhnlich schnellen Rücktritts', *Babylon* 5(1989), 40-46.
- 43 On the German reception of Schindler's List, see: Schneider, *Fetisch Holocaust*, 207-36; 'Der Holocaust aus Hollywood?' *Deutsches Allgemeines Sonntagsblatt* 25 Mar. 1994, p.3; Leopold Glaser, 'Die Zumutung des Erinnerns: Zur deutschen Rezeption von "Schindlers Liste"', *Neue Gesellschaft/Frankfurter Hefte* 41 (May 1994), 400-2; Eike Geisel, 'E.T. bei den Deutschen oder Nationalsozialismus mit menschlichem Antlitz', in: Initiative Sozialistisches Forum (ed.), *Schindlerdeutsche: Ein Kometen vom Dritten Reich* (Freiburg: Ça Ira, 1994), 107-33, cited in Geoff Eley and Atina Grossmann, 'Watching *Schindler's List*: Not the Last Word', *NGC* 71(Spr.-Sum. 1997), 41-62.
- For examples of didactic materials based on the film see: Herbert Schultze, *Schindlers Liste: Materialien zum Film* (Loccum: Religionspädagogisches Institut, 1994); Christine Hesse et al, *Zum Film Schindlers Liste* (Bonn: Bundeszentrale für Politische Bildung, 1995); Wolf-Rüdiger Wagner and Matthias Günther, *Schindlers Liste* (Hannover: Landesmedienstelle, 1995).
- 44 See: Julius Schoeps (ed.), *Ein Volk von Mördern? Die Dokumentation zur Goldhagen-Kontroverse um die Rolle der Deutschen im Holocaust* (Hamburg: Hoffmann & Campe, 1996). Some of these reviews are published in translation in: Robert Shandley (ed.), *Unwilling Germans?: The Goldhagen Debate* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, 1998). A scholarly discussion of the reviews on II-German is archived at: <http://www.h-net.msu.edu/~german/discuss/goldhagen/index.html>.
- On the reception in Germany, see: Josef Joffe, 'Goldhagen in Germany', *New York Review of Books* 43:19(28 Nov. 1996), 18-21; Amos Elon, 'The Antagonist as Liberator', *New York Times Magazine* (26 Jan. 1997), 40-44; Michael Schneider, 'Die "Goldhagen-Debatte": Ein Historikerstreit in der Mediengesellschaft', *Archiv für Sozialgeschichte* 37(1997); Schneider, *Fetisch Holocaust*, 19-98; Angelika Königseder, 'Streitkulturen und Gefühlslagen: Die Goldhagen-Debatte und der Streit um die Wehrmachtsausstellung', in Heil and Erb (eds.), *Geschichtswissenschaft und Öffentlichkeit*, 295-311, 308.
- 45 This decision emerged from the commemoration of the 50th anniversary of the end of World War II in 1995. See: Michael Naumann (b.1949), *Der Krieg als Text: Das Jahr 1945 im kulturellen Gedächtnis der Presse* (Hamburg: Hamburger Edition, 1998).
- 46 The exhibition was shown in March 1995 in Hamburg, then Berlin, Potsdam, Stuttgart, and Vienna; see Karl-Heinz Janen, 'Als Soldaten Mörder wurden', *Zeit*, 24 Mar. 1995, 13f. It is accompanied by a catalog: Hamburger Institut für Sozialforschung (ed.), *Vernichtungskrieg: Verbrechen der Wehrmacht 1941 bis 1944* (Hamburg: Hamburger Edition, 1996), 222 pp; translated by Scott Abbott with a foreword by Omer Bartov as: Hannes Heer, *The German Army and Genocide: Crimes against War Prisoners, Jews, and other Civilians in the East, 1939-1944* (Providence: Berghahn, 2000). See also the volume of essays: Hannes Heer and Klaus Naumann (eds.), *Vernichtungskrieg: Verbrechen der Wehrmacht 1911 bis 1911* (Hamburg: Hamburger Edition, 1995), 685 pp. An additional volume of essays about the reception of the exhibition is scheduled for publication in 1999.

The Hamburg Institute maintains a large web page about the exhibition: <http://www.his-onli->

ne.de/veranst/ausstell/vernicht.htm. The Shoah Foundation in Munich also maintains a web page with links to current exhibition sites: <http://www.shoahproject.org>. On the reception of the exhibition, see: Klaus Naumann, 'Die "saubere" Wehrmacht: Gesellschaftsgeschichte einer Legende', *Mittelweg* 36 7:4 (1998), 8-18; Hans-Günter Thiele (ed.), *Die Wehrmachtsausstellung: Dokumentation einer Kontroverse: Dokumentation der Fuchtagung in Bremen am 26. Februar 1997 und der Bundestagsdebatten am 13. März und 24. April 1997* (Bremen: Temmen, 1997; Bonn: Bundeszentrale für Politische Bildung, 1997); Hannes Heer, 'Von der Schwierigkeit, einen Krieg zu beenden: Reaktionen auf die Ausstellung "Vernichtungskrieg: Verbrechen der Wehrmacht, 1941 bis 1944"', *Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaft* 45(1997), 1086-1100; Hans Arnold, 'Das Ende einer Legende: Anmerkungen zur Wehrmachtsausstellung', *Neue Gesellschaft/Frankfurter Hefte* 44(May 1997), 399-403; Omer Bartov, 'German Soldiers and the Holocaust', in Arad (ed.), *Passing into History*, 162-188; Reinhard Kannonier/Brigitte Kepplinger, 'Irritationen: Wehrmachtsausstellung in Luz' (Grünbach: Franz Steinmal, 1997); Heribert Prantl (ed.) *Wehrmachtverbrechen: Eine deutsche Kontroverse* (Hamburg: Hoffmann und Campe, 1997); Hamburger Institut für Sozialforschung (ed.), *Besucher einer Ausstellung: Die Ausstellung "Vernichtungskrieg: Verbrechen der Wehrmacht 1941 bis 1944" in Interview und Gespräch* (Hamburg: Hamburger Edition, 1998).