

veyed extremely effectively, and supported by formidable command of an enormous array of sources encompassing captured records, SS-Police signals, and various types of oral testimony. The book further benefits from a quietly impassioned, vivid writing style, leaving no doubt as to the enormity of the crimes perpetrated.

Indeed, Blood points out, anti-partisan warfare is too mild a term for the “security campaign” the Nazis unleashed across occupied Europe. The campaign was founded, rather, on the concept of anti-bandit warfare (*Bandenbekämpfung*), which vilified its opponents as “gangsters” undeserving of the treatment normally accorded captured enemy combatants. The German military refined and expanded this concept throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, wedding it to a “Cannae approach” to offensive operations that envisaged the enemy’s encirclement and total destruction. *Bandenbekämpfung* reached its apogee in the cause of the Nazis’ *Lebensraum* program of ideological extermination and economic and spatial conquest in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. The contemptuous terms of reference for *Bandenbekämpfung*’s opponents made it the ideal basis for a security campaign aimed at annihilation and exploitation.

Blood details the directives and developments that eventually placed *Bandenbekämpfung* at the heart of German security policy. The greatest impetus came from Germany’s failure to defeat the Soviet Union in 1941, and the need the Nazis consequently felt for a brutally effective means of pacifying increasingly restive occupied areas, even as they sought to exploit those areas with mounting rapacity. This development benefited above all the SS-Police, which already had proved its ruthless mettle in security matters during the campaigns in Poland and the Soviet Union, and which now assumed a particularly prominent role in security policy. That said, the book provides no succour for those seeking to distance the Wehrmacht, at institutional level at any rate, from such murderous initiatives.

The book’s second part details the mechanisms by which *Bandenbekämpfung* was implemented from 1942 onward. Blood details the methods of information gathering, the order of battle for the “anti-bandit” campaign encompassing SS-Police, army, Luftwaffe, and native auxiliary units, the gradations of bandit area that the Germans identified, “anti-bandit” training, and, via several case studies, the variations on the Cannae method employed in various operations.

The final section details *Bandenbekämpfung*’s application during the war’s latter years, particularly its export elsewhere in occupied Europe. In Poland it was employed more directly than anywhere else in the service of openly genocidal policies. In Southeastern and Western Europe, it was utilized to murderous effect in such critically important regions as Slovenia—the lynchpin, Blood argues, of the eastern and southern battlefronts—and France following D-Day. Blood argues that murderous “security” operations in occupied Western Europe were not aberrations but measures en-

tirely consistent with the murderous precepts of *Bandenbekämpfung* first applied in the East. The final chapter scorns the postwar efforts of men such as Heinrich Himmler’s bandit-hunter-in-chief Erich von dem Bach Zelewski, a central figure throughout the book, to dilute their complicity. In fact, while the *Übermenschen* of the SS “anti-bandit” elite proved frailer than Nazi imagery depicted them, sometimes reacting to their murderous duties with a range of psychosomatic symptoms, this did not translate into actual protests against orders during the war itself.

Future scholars need to examine further individual “security” operations—conducted by the Wehrmacht, SS, and others—and how far they were shaped by conditions in the field and the individual attitudes of units and officers on the spot. Some case studies of this type have already been written by scholars such as Michael Geyer and this reviewer, and Blood takes issue with their conclusions. Yet while it remains important, via a case study approach, to see the trees for the forest, Blood breaks new, important ground in better enabling scholars to discern the forest for the trees. Case studies of Nazi security warfare must also consider the influence of the institutional framework in which operations took place, particularly the general doctrines and methods that were favored, and the mentalities of the higher-level commanders who formulated them. Blood has rendered invaluable service in illuminating these issues to a new and unsettling degree.

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STANISLAV ZÁMEČNÍK. *Das war Dachau*. Translated by PETER HEUMOS and GITTA GROSSMANN. (Die Zeit des Nationalsozialismus.) Frankfurt a. M.: Fischer. 2007. Pp. 435. €10.95.

Given the centrality and notoriety of the Dachau concentration camp, it is rather surprising that the first comprehensive scholarly monograph of the camp’s history by a trained historian was not published until 2002. Czech historian Stanislav Zámečník’s book, first published in German, then in French and the original Czech, and in English in 2004, is now available in a paperback edition by a major German publisher. The earlier editions are only available as publications of the Dachau survivors association at the Dachau memorial site. In order to fully appreciate this comprehensively researched, clearly organized, and smoothly written monograph, it is necessary to know something about the author and the previous historiography of the Dachau camp.

Zámečník, born in 1922, was arrested for resistance activities at age seventeen and transferred to the Dachau camp in February 1941. That fall he was able to begin work in the camp infirmary, a haven from more lethal outdoor work and a nucleus of resistance activity, where he remained until liberation. After studying history at Charles University in Prague, he began work at

the Czech Institute for Military History in 1960, focusing on the history of Czech resistance to Nazism. After the repression of the Prague Spring in 1968, Zámečník was prohibited from conducting historical research, but with the help of German contacts and a friendly librarian in Prague, he was nonetheless able to obtain sources and literature to continue work on this book, publishing a few shorter pieces in Germany, notably a brilliant examination of Heinrich Himmler's reputed order to murder all camp inmates before liberation ("Kein Häftling darf lebend in die Hände des Feindes fallen," Zur Existenz des Himmler-Befehls vom 14./18. April 1945," *Dachauer Hefte* [1985]: 219–231), and a memoir of his time in the Dachau infirmary ("Erinnerungen an das 'Revier' im Konzentrationslager Dachau," *Dachauer Hefte* [1988]: 128–143). After 1989 Zámečník incorporated into his study a host of new archivally based research on the concentration camps, such as Johannes Tuchel's dissertation, *Konzentrationslager: Organisationsgeschichte und Funktion der "Inspektion der Konzentrationslager," 1934–1938* (1991), to name only one of the most important. Zámečník has succeeded in integrating these studies based on bureaucratic documents with the hundreds of published and unpublished accounts of the Dachau camp by those who experienced it firsthand.

This book represents the pinnacle of monographic concentration camp histories. Monographic histories of Nazi concentration camps have long remained the province of camp survivors, beginning with Eugen Kogon's *Der SS-Staat* (1946; *The Theory and Practice of Hell*, 1950; both still in print). The international association of Dachau survivors commissioned Belgian military historian Paul Berben to write the first monograph about Dachau, published in 1968 as *Histoire du Camp de Concentration de Dachau, 1933–1945* (published in English in 1975 as *Dachau 1933–1945: The Official History*). Berben's fine narrative focuses solely on the camp itself, however, without consideration of the historical context. Berben's research and documentary appendixes were incorporated into the first Dachau museum catalog, published in German in 1975 and English in 1978, which remained the only widely available book about the camp until the new catalog was published in 2005. Günther Kimmel's article "Das Konzentrationslager Dachau: Eine Studie zu den nationalsozialistischen Gewaltverbrechen," included in volume two of Martin Broszat's project on the history of everyday life in Bavaria, *Bayern in der NS-Zeit* (1979, pp. 349–413), was the first attempt at a scholarly overview of the camp's history. More recent monographs, such as Hans-Günther Richardi's *Schule der Gewalt* (1983, 1995) and Sybille Steinbacher's *Dachau, die Stadt und das Konzentrationslager* (1993), focus on specific aspects of the camp.

Zámečník's monograph is divided into three chronological-thematic parts, covering the phase of consolidation and preparation for war until 1939, the period of military successes until 1941, and the period in which prisoner labor was used for wartime production. Each

of these parts is divided into clearly titled sections and subsections that comprise essays on the crucial issues of Dachau's and the entire Nazi camp system's history. Throughout the book Zámečník moves effortlessly between specifics about Dachau and developments in the camp system, making this book a gripping narrative that provides a superb analysis of how integral the concentration camp system was to the Nazi Reich itself. As such it is eminently suitable for lay readers (including advanced undergraduates), but it also represents the cutting edge of research on the Dachau camp's history, masterfully assessing the source material on such questions as the "night and fog" executions in fall 1941, medical experiments, the Dachau gas chamber, and the extent to which an "international" resistance movement in the camp existed. We must hope that a major publisher will make the English translation widely available as well.

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NORMAN J. W. GODA. *Tales from Spandau: Nazi Criminals and the Cold War*. New York: Cambridge University Press. 2007. Pp. xiii, 390. \$30.00.

At the end of World War II, some 12 million German soldiers were imprisoned and thousands of Nazi leaders interned. Most POWs were released within a year, and many of the Nazi small fry returned home soon too. Few admitted outright guilt; most thought they were victims of the war or Allied punishment.

But how do you deal with the leadership of a nation that unleashed the worst aggressive and genocidal war in history? The Allies faced this unprecedented challenge, once Adolf Hitler's Nazi Germany invaded Poland, killed civilians in the bombing of London and other cities, and unleashed a war of racial extermination against Jews and other minorities. They decided to set up the International Military Tribunal (IMT) in Nuremberg (and many succession trials) and indicted the worst offenders on charges of conspiracy, crimes against peace, war crimes, and crimes against humanity (e.g., the murder, enslavement, deportation, or extermination of civilian populations). The last charge in particular was a new legal concept that opened up the floodgates of charges of "victor's justice," or applying *ex post facto* law to defeated enemies (p. 10). This allowed major war criminals to feel victimized too.

The four-power IMT lasted from November 1945 to October 1946. Twelve of the defendants were sentenced to death by hanging, three were acquitted, while seven received unexpected prison terms. Norman J. W. Goda's book is about the fate of these seven prisoners, incarcerated at Spandau in the British sector of Berlin.

This is a masterpiece of sophisticated historical analysis on the intersections among legal history ("the trial of the century" and the administration of justice of the imprisoned Nazi war criminals), Cold War diplomatic