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"What Stalin Knew about the Nazi Invasion" Book Essay on: David E. Murphy,
by Matthew Neal for Prof. Marcuse's lecture course |
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& Abstract |
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About Matthew Neal I am a junior history major who has been studying the development of modern Europe and the Cold War. I am studying at the University of Padua next fall and hope to visit some parts of Germany. I chose to write about Operation Barbarossa because I am very interested in the Second World War, and particularly the Eastern Front. Abstract (back to top) David E. Murphy’s What Stalin Knew: The Enigma of Barbarossa is about the failure of the Soviet Union, and particularly Stalin to foresee and effectively deal with Operation Barbarossa, the German invasion of June 21, 1941. His main argument is that the reason for this was not so much that the German military intelligence did a good job of making their plans not known, but that they successfully convinced Stalin that they were not planning to invade. Many in the Soviet intelligence community knew that the Germans were going to attack, but the culture of fear that was set up by the Stalinist purges of the late 1930s prevented most from speaking their minds. Those that did speak up were punished; often they paid with their life. Murphy makes this argument effectively and has a great deal of evidence to back up his points. As a former intelligence officer for the CIA, he gives a very unique and qualified view into the inner workings of the German deception of Stalin. |
Essay (back to top) Germany attacked the Soviet Union on June 22, 1941. During the early stages of this attack, known as Operation Barbarossa, the Soviets suffered staggering casualties, while the German army advanced deep into Soviet territory. Much of the Soviet Air Force was destroyed before even taking off. The Soviet army was poorly deployed and by no means combat ready. The Soviet Union was one of the most industrialized countries in the world, and with proper leadership they surely could have fended off the German attack somewhat better. The German army was much better equipped and experienced, but many of their successes are due in large part to enormous Soviet failures; and in particular, Stalin’s failures. David E. Murphy, who wrote What Stalin Knew: The Enigma of Barbarossa, is a former CIA officer who worked on Soviet affairs. He places a very large importance on the intelligence aspect leading up to Operation Barbarossa. Specifically, he argues that the German intelligence tricked the Soviets into believing that Germany would attack the United Kingdom and keep its non-aggression pact with the Soviet Union. In addition to the German intelligence’s deception, the nature of Stalin’s regime also led to sycophantic yes-men being promoted to top ranks. Anyone who disagreed with Stalin would be removed from office, and very likely killed. Stalin was convinced that Hitler would keep his word, and no one dared to question his view. Even after the invasion had begun, Stalin did not believe that Hitler would do such a thing; that is how thorough a job the Germans had done. Murphy argues that these two factors, the nature of the Stalinist regime, combined with effective German deception, were the reasons why the Soviet Union was taken completely by surprise on June 22 of 1942. What Stalin Knew is a very intelligence oriented book. It is very evident that it is written from the perspective of a former American Cold Warrior. At times it does get a bit too technical. However, Murphy does a good job at laying out exactly why Operation Barbarossa was so surprising to the top members of the Soviet Union. He places the blame for this mostly on Stalin’s shoulders. The German intelligence services deceived the Soviets into thinking that they would invade Britain, and not fight a war on two fronts. In addition, the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact of August 1939 was more proof that the Germans had no plans to invade, as secret parts of that pact essentially gave Poland to Germany, and Finland and the Baltic States to the Soviet Union. Stalin was convinced that Hitler would keep his word. He also believed, rightly, that Britain and France would enter a war with Germany due to the invasion of Poland. He figured that Hitler would get bogged down in a land war in Western Europe. Stalin, in convincing the Politburo members that the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact was a good idea, said in reference to a war between Germany and an Anglo-French alliance that “one must do everything to ensure that the war lasts as long as possible in order to exhaust both sides” (Murphy, pg. 26). Stalin expected the French to hold out slightly longer than they did. When they did not, he was still not confident that it would lead to a German invasion. Stalin was absolutely committed to the idea that Hitler would not fight a two front war, and certainly not make the same mistakes that Napoleon had. According to Murphy, Stalin miscalculated Germany’s two front war, as “after the evacuation of the British forces from Dunkirk, there were no British troops left on the Continent” (Murphy, pg. 174). This is where the deception of an invasion of Britain, called Operation Sea Lion, was crucial to the German efforts to conceal their true intentions. A key point to this deception was that in reality, they only had to convince basically one man, Stalin himself. Murphy argues that the German deception was not particularly effective, as many Soviet intelligence officers saw through it but, those who spoke out were purged. The main example that David Murphy gives of this are the two lead Soviet Intelligence officers in the GRU, which stands for the Main Intelligence Directorate. Ivan Proskurov was an honest and straightforward officer, who actually spoke of the realities of the situation. Filipp Golikov was basically the opposite of that. He was a sycophant who told Stalin basically what he wanted to hear. When Proskurov spoke honestly about why the Soviet army was so thoroughly embarrassed by the Finns during the disastrous Winter War, he was publicly critical about Soviet tactics. This infuriated Stalin, and soon after Proskurov was removed as head of Military Intelligence. Murphy argues that this also tied in with Stalin’s beliefs about Hitler. On July 16 Hitler gave the “Führer Directive № 16” (Murphy, pg. 140), which called for an invasion of the British Isles. Stalin asked Proskurov if that would be possible, and Proskurov essentially said that they would not be prepared in time for the weather, and the operation would not go through. Murphy argues that Stalin was so enamored with this idea of the Germans not attacking them, that he fired Proskurov directly due to this assessment. Murphy makes a good point here, as the day after he gave the assessment he was removed from his post. It is certainly possible that Proskurov was dismissed for other reasons, but Murphy puts forth a convincing argument that it was due in large part to Stalin’s unwillingness to accept that the Germans would not invade the United Kingdom. Ivan Proskurov was assigned to the Air Force as a Lieutenant General. After the near complete destruction of the Soviet air force, due mostly to Stalin’s orders, he was “accused of membership in a military conspiratorial organization” (Murphy, pg. 231). He refused to admit his guilt and was summarily executed without trial on October 28, 1941 (Murphy, pg. 259). This is what happened to those intelligence officers who were forthright about the coming invasion. Proskurov was not the only one warning Stalin about the German machinations. As early as July of 1940, nearly a year before Operation Barbarossa commenced, Winston Churchill warned the Soviet ambassador that “Hitler hates the Bolsheviks and is waiting only for the appropriate circumstances to deliver the final blow” (Murphy pg. 147). Not only the British, but also the Americans warned the Soviets about the invasion. Stalin refused to accept these things, and they were most certainly underplayed by his fearful subordinates. Even on June 21,1941 they were warned. Beria demanded the recall and punishment of their ambassador in Berlin who kept supplying them with “disinformation” that Hitler would attack the next day (Murphy, p.149). Murphy presents a great deal of these kinds of reports that demonstrate incredibly thoroughly that at least some in the Soviet intelligence community were very aware of Operation Barbarossa. Murphy makes the point very well that it was not so much the German deception as the unwillingness of Stalin to change his world view based upon new facts and reality. He was so convinced of the fact that Germany would not attack that he made sure to punish anyone who did not toe the line. Murphy devotes a good amount of text to the actual logistics of the German deception. While this is certainly informative, it does not seem to fit with the overall argument of the book. The only real reason that the German deception was successful was not due to German skills, but rather Soviet failings. Throughout the book he details the numerous warnings sent to Stalin and Molotov and other senior officials about the looming German invasion. These were ignored, and those who spoke of them were punished. This obviously led to a climate of fear and of telling Stalin what he wanted to hear. Stalin wanted to hear that the Germans would not attack the Soviet Union, but rather invade Britain. The man who came to replace Proskurov was Filipp Golikov, who included information about the German invasion of the British Isles in his briefings to Stalin and described the reports about Germany invading as “German or English deception” (Murphy, pg. 175). Germany played on this, by mobilizing troops on the border with the USSR and having them build defensive works. They assured the Soviet government that they were “returning to former garrison areas, [or being sent] out of the range of British bombers” (Murphy, pg 175.) While this was somewhat plausible, as the troops were indeed being moved out of the range of the British air force, it seems fairly obvious what German intentions were. While this kind of action, combined with reports coming from many different intelligence services, would seem to lead to the conclusion of a coming invasion, but Stalin’s subordinates made sure not to make that conclusion, at least not to Stalin. Murphy goes on to debunk a theory that Stalin was planning to attack Hitler in July 1941, and that’s why he was trying to stall and not go to war with Germany. This seems somewhat out of place, but it does debunk an alternative explanation as to why Stalin was not prepared for Operation Barbarossa. The most important part of the German deception was the personal and private correspondence between Hitler and Stalin right before the invasion. According to Marshal Georgii Zhukov, Stalin had written Hitler a letter of concern about the German troops stationed on his border. Hitler responded that “these are not directed against the Soviet Union. I intend to observe the [nonaggression] pact strictly and swear on my honor as a chief of state that my troops are deployed in [Poland] for other purposes” (Murphy, pg. 186). According to Zhukov, Stalin believed Hitler. There is very little evidence of these letters, but Murphy argues that this is for two reasons: Hitler had his personal correspondence with heads of state destroyed at the end of the war, and Stalin would have had any evidence that he was taken in by Hitler’s treachery destroyed (Murphy, pg. 191). This is a very reasonable argument and it does help to explain why Stalin would have been so adamant about his belief that the Germans would not attack. However, with no archival evidence, and based on somewhat dubious sources, it is very difficult to say if this is accurate. This argument by Murphy seems plausible, but very unverifiable. What is verifiable is that Stalin allowed the Germans to come into Soviet territory basically unopposed. When he was told of the invasion by Zhukov, he initially refused to believe it for hours, or even days (Murphy, pg. 216). Stalin’s inaction led to huge losses within the first few days of the attack, including much of the Soviet air force, which was destroyed on the ground. Murphy makes the main argument that while the German deception of the intelligence community was not all that great, it did not really matter. Stalin was the one who had to be convinced, and according to David Murphy, he was completely convinced that Hitler would not attack him. He received many reports to the contrary, but did not listen to them. Leading up to Operation Barbarossa most of his subordinates were too afraid to challenge his view on it. Ultimately, Murphy makes a good argument, although at times he does rely on somewhat dubious evidence, such as the no longer existing letters to Stalin from Hitler. The evidence that is dubious is only relevant to some points, so it does not greatly reduce the impact of the argument as a whole. Murphy makes his points well, and has a great deal of evidence to back them up. It is evident that a great many people were convinced of the impending war between Germany and the USSR, but all that did not matter, as Stalin was the one who had to believe it. |
Bibliography and Links (back to top)(links last checked 3/x/07) |
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Any student tempted to use this paper for an assignment in another course or school should be aware of the serious consequences for plagiarism. Here is what I write in my syllabi:
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