UC Santa Barbara > History Department > Prof. Marcuse > Courses > Hist 133b Homepage > Hist 133b Book Essays Index page > Student essay
 |
"Hitler & Appeasement: A Rational Choice" Book Essay on:
by Ryan May for Prof. Marcuse's lecture course |
|
& Abstract |
and Links |
at amazon |
About Ryan May I am a senior Political Science major at with an emphasis in international relations at UC Santa Barbara. I was originally a Business major but after taking an international affairs course to satisfy a general education requirement, I switched almost immediately. I have studied European foreign affairs in many courses, however, I never received a strong introduction to Germany, which I found interesting due to their significant role in international affairs in the 20th century. As a result, I registered for a course that could introduce me to this material. I chose the topic of Britain’s appeasement towards Hitler because I wanted to understand how Hitler was nearly able to conquer all of Europe twenty-five years after the German state had been devastated in the First World War. Abstract (back to top) Peter Neville wrote a book attempting to discredit the numerous theories that argue that Britain’s policy of appeasement of Hitler was due to incompetent leadership and poor decision making. British leaders were hopeful that war and violence could be avoided through concessions and the British made every attempt to avoid another World War. Neville argues that the British appeasement policy was rational given the domestic and international situations facing Britain at the time. He suggests that such restrictions such as the state of the economy, public opinion, and emerging states throughout the world played a significant role in influencing Britain’s endorsement of appeasement. The leaders were not ignorant of the Nazi threat but were restricted by the actions they could take. |
Essay (back to top) Hitler & Appeasement: A Rational Choice Following World War I, the terms of the Versailles treaty were seen by many to be exceptionally harsh on the Germans. The oppressive armistice and economic hardships placed upon Germany gave reason for many in Britain to favor a more positive relationship with Germany that would give Germany a chance to rebuild at a moderate level. It was the belief that an economically sound Germany was beneficial to all of Europe and would preserve peace. On a moral level, many Brits did not want the German people to starve or live in poverty. From a tactical standpoint, there was the fear that a weak Germany would side with the communists in Russia. As a result of these viewpoints, the British were less motivated to force these conditions on the Germans and began to allow them more flexibility through appeasement.Many argue that appeasement was due to the incompetence of leadership and lack of a resolution. Another viewpoint is put forth by Robert Neville is his book Hitler and Appeasement. Neville attempts to answer ‘why appeasement and not force?’ He argues that British appeasement began as a rational decision and continued along that path of rationality up until the beginning of the war. Critics of appeasement have the gift of hindsight and fail to acknowledge the environment in which appeasement was chosen. Neville’s book correctly argues that appeasement was rational due to the economic, domestic, military, and international conditions in which the decision for appeasement was made. . The Underlying Conditions for Appeasement: Neville attempts to understand why Britain was willing to make concessions with Germany and remarks that it is important to understand the conditions that guided the British policy of appeasement. Following the collapse of the stock market, Britain was not an the economic situation to engage in another war. The depression of the late 1920’s hit Britain hard and the government was not willing to put money into the military sector while taking away from the public sector. As Neville points out, many in the British government did not oppose rearmament, but many did fear the economy could not handle it. There was no question that Germany could be perceived as a threat but there was a question of the availability of resources. The British were not economically in a position to defend the Versailles treaty even if they wanted to, and all that could be done was concessions in the mind of the appeasers. Neville points out that “all that could be done was an ordering of the concessionary process, so that Germany would not use violence” (pg. 27). The economic situation and the availability of resources was not the only rationale behind Britain’s appeasement policy. Public opinion played a large role in directing Britain’s approach to foreign policy. The left and right within Britain were not willing to engage in another war of attrition and total war, like they had recently experienced in World War 1. The public and many within the government felt that the arms race was the cause for World War 1. Therefore, many heavily favored an Anglo-German understanding, one that did not involve force but diplomacy. The media also played a large role in determining the public opinion of Nazism. The editor of the Observer J.L Garvin interviewed Hitler in 1936 and felt that “Hitler was genuinely anxious for understanding with the British” (pg. 22). With this perspective of Hitler, Garvin was in a position to influence public opinion to sympathize with Hitler. The belief that Hitler and Nazi leaders were moderates was a common belief that resonated in British thought for many years. This common British belief of moderate Nazis united with the common fear of another total war led public opinion in Britain to favor appeasement over force. The British also feared that they were inferior militarily to regional actors, which, in many aspects, was due to the lack of significant rearmament that shaped policy in the l920’s and early 1930’s. The British overestimated Italian military strength, feared German air superiority and simply underestimated their own strength. They were unprepared for an offensive war and not until the late 1930’s did Britain’s military receive adequate funding. One viewpoint that was shared by many was that of Kingsley Martin, editor of one leading newspaper in Britain named The New Statesman, “People are terrified by the combined brutality and efficiency of the Germans and that if there was a war we should lose it” (pg. 88). Neville argues that due to poor intelligence regarding a majority of foreign states military capacities and the fear of their own inadequate offensive and air capabilities, British public opinion and the majority of the government favored appeasement over military action. The British were not aware that Hitler’s army was not prepared for a total war for much of the 1930s. Neville points to Germany’s pursuit of the Rhineland as an example. Britain simply conceded the Rhineland to Germany, since it feared the risk of war. In actuality Hitler had told his troops to return home if confronted and it was even stated that many Germans arrived in the Rhineland on bicycles. If Britain had known this they more than likely would have confronted Germany. However, given the intelligence the British had in regard to German power and the inadequacy of their own power, to engage in military conflict with the Germans would have been a huge risk. Neville argues that many critics ignore the role of two other potentially hostile powers. Britain found itself in hostile international conditions and had to be very delicate in its dealings with Mussolini’s Italy and Emperor Hirohito’s Japan to maintain good relations. Britain feared that if any of these powers were to unite with Germany, the outcome could be very dangerous and these powers could ally against Britain. Britain feared Japanese power because Britain realized they could not confront Japan without the aid of the United States, because they were not willing to split their forces by sending troops to the Far East, thereby weakening their European forces. In the late 1920’s and early 1930’s the British were optimistic that Italy and Britain could work together against Nazism, specifically in reference to Nazism in Austria. An example of cooperation was in July 1934 when Hitler encouraged Austrian Nazis to mount a coup against their dictator. Enraged, Mussolini sent troops to the Brenner Pass. Effectively, with British and French help, these powers warned Hitler off Austrian territory. It was clear to the British that cooperation was beneficial to maintaining peace instead of war. Accommodation was made by the British to Italy in territorial concessions outside Abyssinia in East Africa in hopes of maintaining good relations. Later, however, strong ties with Italy would be unsuccessful as Mussolini would not object to German invasion of Austria. However, good relations with Italy were rational given the state of the international system and as Neville argues, “the attempt to achieve an accommodation with Mussolini was worthwhile given the perceptions of the time which recognized Germany as a threat” (pg. 58). Neville accurately states that “successive British governments were acutely aware of Britain’s weakness in a global context” and as a result of this had to be willing to use appeasement to maintain good relations (pg. 49). Neville points out that the United States favored isolationism, and the French were too weak to make a stand. If the British were to engage Germany they had to fear the Japanese and Italian positions as well as assume they were going to war alone. The international conditions were not in favor of any other policy by the British other than appeasement for they feared Italy and Japan and had no commitments from France or America. Appeasement as a Rational Explanation: As is evident from the above descriptions, Britain favored appeasement over any other policy in hopes to maintain peace with Germany. Public opinion feared war, the resources were not available to allocate a large portion of the budget to military spending, and Britain was fearful of potential conflicts with other emerging powers. These conditions dictated British foreign policy towards Germany, which is evident in future diplomatic interactions. Britain routinely ignored violations by Germany of the Versailles treaty and other agreements. Neville argues that critics see the Rhineland as the turning point in the path towards war and a perfect example of the cowardice and indecisiveness of British leadership. Some claim Chamberlain committed a dereliction in duty and as Churchill said, “"He was given a choice between war and dishonor. He chose dishonor and he will have war anyway” (Winston Churchill Quotes). In actuality, this conflict was a perfect example of the rational thought behind British foreign policy. Neville argues this displayed “that the reality of the situation was neither France nor England was really in a position to take effective military action against Germany in the event of a violation of Locarno” (pg.71). Germany’s rearmament of the Rhineland was a violation of the Locarno Pact and they could have been held accountable. However, Britain was not militarily prepared for war and was not willing to risk war in defense of territory perceived as inevitable to be lost and of no real significance to them. This was thus not an act of weakness and incompetence but of rationality. The best argument put forth by Neville that the British policy of appeasement was the correct approach is evident in the Munich Agreement. The Munich Agreement was an agreement made between the great powers in response to the Sudetenland crisis. This Czechoslovakian territory was ethnically German and very industrialized and was desired by the Germans. The Sudetenland was eventually given to the Germans without a shot being fired and without the consultation of Czech government. Chamberlain, the head British negotiator, was treated with a hero’s welcome after the signing for he had supposedly prevented war. The London Times reported that “no conqueror returning from a victory on the battlefield had ever come adorned with nobler laurels” (pg. 115). Despite the great acclaim this agreement initially received, it is often cited as the nadir in the failure of appeasement. One can argue that appeasement was wrong because it was immoral for the British to surrender another country’s territory in order to avoid war. It can also be argued that Hitler was an irrational, violent liar and never should anyone have come into agreement with him and trusted him. Appeasement can be said to be wrong because it gave aid to Hitler and possibly provoked Mussolini into reevaluating his own foreign policy which would later become more aggressive. British appeasement in regards to Sudetenland can be interpreted as rewarding power politics and the threat of force. It can be argued that Britain’s appeasement policy went against the hopes for maintaining peace that Britain wanted to ensure through treaties, following the first World War and therefore the policy should not have been implemented. Neville correctly argues that the critiques of appeasement are flawed and fail to recognize the conditions of the time and that these critics use hindsight to justify their belief in its ineptitude. Hitler was irrational and should not have been trusted, but this is only easy to see in the hindsight. Neville introduces one quotation that Hitler was still to be trusted and was a worthy to be leader; as late as 1936, Hitler was still perceived as “a very great man. Fuhrer is the proper name for him, for he is a born leader, yes, and a statesman” by Former Chancellor Exchequer and Prime Minister David Lloyd George – a highly respected liberal party member. Many still agreed with this viewpoint. To argue ‘Chamberlain and the British government were idiotic in their trust of Hitler’ is not accurate. They knew the potential danger and they chose the lesser of two evils. They chose concessions over confrontation and possibly war. Neville points out that the concept of self-determination for the Germans within the Sudetenland was the very foundation of Wilson’s 14 points. Many ridicule Chamberlain and British policy makers for ignoring a faraway country which they knew little about. But this was not the case and British leadership wanted to ensure the national identity of the Sudeten minority – which was a strong point of the British drafted Versailles treaty, and it was hard for them to ignore this principle. The book does fail to suggest some ideas that Britain could have debated in regards to how to approach Nazi Germany. Britain continued to make concession after concession to Germany, and as argued by Neville, these decisions were understandable. What Neville does not mention is that Britain kept appeasing Hitler without any real plan for a stopping point at which Hitler could ask for no more. Never did the English say, you can have the Rhineland but this is all you will get and if you attempt to acquire more, there will be consequences. For example, economic sanctions or trade barriers could have been detrimental to Germany. Germany was heavily reliant on trade for food and raw materials. Without these goods, Germany’s productivity and expansion would have been limited. Another point that is less realistic but is one not mentioned by Neville is Britain’s choice at isolationism. Neville does not even entertain this idea even when he speaks of the United States position towards Germany and Europe prior to World War II. Perhaps, if the British took a stance of isolationism and let France and USSR honor their alliance with Czechoslovakia the outcome would have been different. It is often forgotten that the French military and English Navy was stronger than Germany’s for most of the 1930s. Perhaps, Britain could have made if mutual protection pact with the United States as long as both undertook isolationist policies. If Germany was able to dominate Europe and united with Japan, as Britain feared, it would have been in the interest of both Britain and the U.S. to take action. Britain would have feared German hegemony as much as the U.S would have. American interests would be in jeopardy if Germany possessed that much power just as the U.S. feared the abundance of Soviet power following World War II. The idea of isolationism may seen as far fetched but it was one idea that was not even considered by Neville. The possibility that Japan and Italy could attack the British if Britain were to confront Germany is one view that is often overlooked by those critical to appeasement. British global positioning, the fact that the French were weak and the U.S could not be counted on for arms or much economic aid also aided in the decision for appeasement. Public opinion and the limited availability of resources restricted many options other than appeasement. Due to British intelligence, Britain did not know that Germany could not be constrained by anything but force until it was too late. The British feared war for many reasons and acted rationally in doing everything possible to prevent it. “Appeasement failed in the end because these evils were insurmountable without the use of force, but British statesmen recognized the need to try conciliation before they resorted to force, knowing as they did the terrible price in blood and treasure demanded in twentieth-century warfare” (pg. 202). It is easy to look back and ask ‘why did they not stop Hitler?’ but ‘stopping Hitler before World War II began’ was not that simple. |
Bibliography and Links (back to top)(links last checked 3/x/07) Book Reviews
Books and Articles
Web Sites
|
|
Any student tempted to use this paper for an assignment in another course or school should be aware of the serious consequences for plagiarism. Here is what I write in my syllabi:
|