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"What Hitler Didn't Know " Book Essay on:
Zachary Shore,
by
Tracy Kavanaugh for Prof. Marcuse's lecture course |
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& Abstract |
and Links |
at amazon |
About Tracy Kavanaugh I am a senior History major with an emphasis in the Classical and Archaic history. I have always been fascinated by the complex history of Germany. I was able to visit Hitler's "Eagles Nest" in Berchtesgaden in June of 2004. I like to learn about German history and have always taken an interest in the classes that I have taken. I am grateful that I have been able to extend my knowledge through this course. I chose this book because I was interested to learn about what happened behind the scenes in German Foreign Policy. The subject interested me because I wanted to know how Hitler interacted with other leaders of the time of World War Two. Abstract (back to top) This book explains the inside workings of the Germany Foreign Ministry, and how important it was to acquire information. The book leads readers through the early years where Hitler was completely dependent on his ministry for information. The information provided by his top administrators was crucial for deciding what moves he was going to take next in his government policies. Many of these choices shaped the advancement and eventual outcome of World War Two. Author Zachary Shore, who is a research scholar at the University of California Berkley and has also served on policy planning staff at the U.S Department of State for foreign relations who has lived in Europe for six years now writes this compelling book. Shore pushes the idea that Hitler did not have sufficient information to make his own choices towards foreign policy. Hitler unknowingly was led by his Foreign Ministry. In my essay I show evidence to support the author's claim, along with some counter evidence. This may shed some light on whether the Holocaust was avoidable in those desperate times. |
Essay (back to top) What Hitler Did Not Know The access to information is the most important asset in having a powerful regime. The amount of information that gets to the head of administration is even more important. Zachary Shores’ book What Hitler Knew: The Battle For Information in Nazi Foreign Policy gives an explanation towards the transmission of information from the Foreign Ministry to the Führer. Zachary Shore argues that information was not only held for job security but also to ensure the survival of the individual members of the inner circle in Hitler’s council. In the 1920s Hitler was not a very popular political figure throughout Europe, but there were several things he orchestrated that made many people finally follow him. Once he became a figure in the German political domain, he pulled Germany out of the League of Nations on October 13, 1933. Soon after that he started to make plans to get rid of long time rival Poland. All of this gave Hitler mass popularity, but with assaults by the SA he was not gaining the kind of support he needed. Hitler was able to get Röhm removed from an administrating role in the army, and the SA was not as powerful as it once was but continued to operate, and the army was under Hitler’s control. On the eve of terror Shore states that “Failure to obtain information on the Führer’s intentions could be disastrous” (Shore pg.47). This is the first evidence implying that the battle for information was an important asset in a person’s survival in the Reich. There were many important diplomats who played large roles in the way the government operated during the Third Reich. One of these key players was Constantin Freiherr von Neurath, who was head of the Foreign Ministry. He was a skilled diplomat who would end up serving the German government for thirty years. Even though Neurath was very loyal to the government he wanted to be able to obtain information that no one else would be able to have. The desire for information was high, and the information that got to Hitler was limited. One of the pinnacles of Neurath’s career with Hitler came with the acquisition and remilitarization of the Rhine. There was a question of whether the French would retaliate if the Germans marched in and took it back. Neurath had always pushed Hitler to take back the Rhine, and Neurath had information on French military actions. Neurath seemed to demonstrate that he thought that the French would not retaliate. After the seizure of the Rhine the Chancellor appeared to have no knowledge of French military weakness. If Neurath would have been wrong and the French would have retaliated, Hitler would have resigned and the blame would have been put on Neurath. Considering what had happened on the Night of Long Knives, the decision to withhold information was a gamble on Neurath’s life. This is an example of the kind of information that was held from Hitler. Neurath had gotten information that the French would not retaliate, but Neurath wanted to show Hitler he was able to get information that no one else could provide him. One man was hindering Neurath's complete control of the Foreign Ministry, Joachim von Ribbentrop. While the Rhine crisis was approaching, Ribbentrop, understanding the need for information, tried to infiltrate meetings that Neurath held. Shore explains, “Ribbentrop attempted to wheedle his way into Neurath’s domain by planting one of his personal representatives- or spies- at the foreign minister’s daily top-level meetings” (Shore pg.52). With the Rhine situation it was shown how important information was. If Ribbentrop would have been able to obtain that information, Neurath knew that his job and life might have been in danger. Neurath knew he had to do everything he could to make sure as little information got to Ribbentrop as possible. “This recognition could only have been heightened by the ongoing political infighting and intrusions from Nazi party interlopers, Ribbentrop primary among them” (Shore pg.67). Since Ribbentrop was a Nazi and Neurath was not, Hitler did not trust Neurath as much as was needed to keep serving at his post in the foreign ministry. Ribbentrop proved to be a man with much luck and success in London, which gained him much praise from Hitler. This was the beginning of the downfall of Neurath. Neurath was the last diplomat to practice traditional diplomacy inside of the Reich, and along with that he was not a Nazi. Because of those two reasons Hitler decided that it was the end of Neurath’s career. With this his rival, Ribbentrop, took his post as Foreign Minister. Joachim von Ribbentrop was a person who only looked out for his own personal idea of what the government’s next move should be. Ribbentrop was able to guide Hitler’s foreign policy by giving him information that he favored. While Neurath was still foreign minister, Ribbentrop was appointed by Hitler to head a German delegation meeting. This appointment “enabled Ribbentrop to circumvent Neurath and report directly to the chancellor, while Neurath remained cut off from important information” (Shore pg.78). This helped Ribbentrop gain ground with Hitler and gain his trust so he could eventually take over Neurath’s job. Ribbentrop tried to influence Hitler in his foreign policy ideas so they would conform to the way he believed that they should be conducted. The biggest event had to do with signing a non-aggression treaty. Hitler wanted to sign one with Britain, but Ribbentrop had wanted to have one with Soviet Russia and declare war on the Western powers. A man who was not an official of the German administration, Wohlthat, had met with British Prime Minister Chamberlain who had expressed his desire to draw up plans of a non-aggression pact with Germany, and Wohlthat gave these reports to Ribbentrop. As the book explains, “Ribbentrop was intent on pursuing an alliance with Soviet Russia and had no intention of seeing those plans derailed, even if it meant denying Hitler access to information” (Shore pg.88). This is just one of the denials of information Ribbentrop orchestrated to have his plan pan out just as he wanted. The idea of having all the information was important to Ribbentrop. Ribbentrop found out that Wolthat had sent the whole details to Göring, who delayed the message going to Ribbentrop, which he saw as detrimental. Even with reports from two administrators who met with British delegates being sent to Berlin, “Ribbentrop had effectively blocked Dirksen’s information from reaching the chancellor” (Shore pg.99). Dirksen was the German Ambassador in Moscow and he had met with a British representative about having non-aggression talks with Britain. Ribbentrop wanted the non-aggression pact with the Soviet Union and this is why this Dirksens message never got to Hitler. This was what led to the eventual signing of the Nazi-Soviet pact which partially determined the course of World War Two. Ernst von Weizsäcker was very loyal to conveyor of information in the Foreign Ministry, but even he hid information from Ribbentrop and the chancellor. One important event that could have propelled the signing of the Nazi-Soviet pact occurred where Weizsäcker had information but neglected to tell Ribbentrop because he wanted to push the agenda of the Anglo-German agreement. Eventually one of Hitler’s top advisors, Higler, talked about the speech Stalin had made about changing the foreign minister in Soviet Russia. This would in turn let Stalin sign an agreement with Germany without opposition. As soon as Higler was done telling the story it became apparent that, “Hitler had not learned of Stalin’s speech to the Party Congress. In fact, neither had Ribbentrop” (Shore pg.111). This was a hit to the confidence that Hitler had placed in Ribbentrop, and it was a shock to Ribbentrop. As the story unfolds Shore explains that “Weizsäcker at least knew of Stalin’s speech by May 6, four days before Hitler’s meeting with Hilger” (Shore pg.111). This shows that information was being hidden from the Foreign Minister in a struggle for power. Shore explains what Weizsäcker did the best when it says “The State Secretary served as a conduit of information, and his silence on this point could have been one among many subtle acts of information control” (Shore pg.112). These crucial points on the start of the war show how important having information is when trying to control a regime. Hitler was in the dark about many of the things that were going on in foreign policy. His top advisors were not giving him vital information. It seems most of the moves he made that were praised by the Germans, were pushed by the foreign policies of his advisors. Ribbentrop was a clever administrator who was able to steal the position away from Neurath, but he was not able to keep all the information to himself. Other people wanted to have a stable career in the Nazi political party as well. This essay’s main argument is that information was a crucial commodity in Nazi Germany. After the mass murder of SA leaders on The Night of Long Knives it was clear that one must have information in order to be important enough to Hitler to stay on his good side. Having information not only let you have a stable career but it insured you survival. The book illustrates this by stating, “In Hitler’s Reich, however, the stakes in the battle for information involved matters of life or death- and peace or war” (Shore pg.120). Not only did the citizens live in a climate of fear, the people closest to Hitler constantly had to watch what they said and what they did. In reference to the many attempts to pass information on to Hitler about the British offer to draw up a non-aggression pact with Germany, all the information was intercepted by Ribbentrop and never given to Hitler, who never knew of the offer. The book suggests that Hitler was kept in the dark about many things that were happening in his ministries. Shore addresses the question of whether Hitler had had this information, would anything have turned out differently. Shore answers this by stating, “[whether] policy outcomes would surely have been more prudent or would have been altogether different in the absence of risk taking can never be determined” (Shore pg.123). There will always be such “what if” questions, but no one could ever be sure what might have happened. Shore says that historians have speculated that the Holocaust might have never happened, but that remains pure speculation. This book contains a strong argument and clear evidence about the importance of information. Inside the walls that held the Nazi political force many people were fighting for power and for praise from Hitler. The regime ultimately fell apart due to the insecurity issues that everyone in the administration had to face. In reference to information being withheld, Shore writes that the British “did not understand that Hitler’s regime fostered internal deception and manipulation of information” (Shore pg.101). It is obvious that many people in the sphere of influence around Hitler ran their own agendas. Shore makes a strong argument with many pieces of evidence that make it sound indisputable. There is possible counter-evidence to the author’s underlying suggestion that Hitler did not have much weight in the decisions on foreign policy. Shore suggests that it was not Neurath’s fault that information flow was so poor. The book states that Hitler made this system suffer by his “tendency toward risk fostered by the frenetic system that Hitler, himself, created” (Shore, pg.67). The people such as Neurath and later Ribbentrop were forced into concealing information from Hitler, but only because of his early decisions. Hitler had made the decisions to push people into submission by fear. Many ideas were passed on to Hitler, ideas on the foreign policy that had to be decided on. The foreign policy head would comment on them, but sometimes, especially during the end of the war, it did not seem to matter to Hitler, who wanted to make the decision himself. The foreign ministry office considered aid to the Spanish rebels as a bad idea in that it might sour relations with the Spanish government. The book explains, “On the same day that Hitler met with Franco’s representatives and decided to extend German aid, Dieckhoff outlined the ministry’s opposition to involvement” (Shore pg.81). This shows that Hitler went against what the foreign ministry thought that the ultimate decision was. Hitler towards the end of the war seemed to just want allies, contrary to what might have been best for the regime. The book states that shortly after the Spanish aid controversy, “neither the Foreign Ministry’s nor the AO’s information mattered to Hitler” (Shore pg.81). The Foreign Ministry had lost the struggle for power in the top administrative body of the Nazi state. The ultimate counter-argument comes in the conclusion of the book when it is clear that this lack of information flow was due to Hitler’s chaotic style of leadership. The book states, “Both the climate of fear and the uncertainty within which the diplomats operated produced increased risk taking risks that ultimately led to global war” (Shore pr.118). This spotlights the point that because the way Hitler treated government policy is the reason why his country was brought into war. The war could have been prevented if many things had happened differently, but that remains speculation. The author’s main argument was that to be in Hitler’s inner circle you had to have information. Personally I would recommend this book for people wanting to understand who really made the rash decisions when it came to foreign policy within the Nazi state. Hitler was played like a puppet who followed his advisors and never questioned their legitimacy. This lacks information for a counter-argument to the author’s main argument. There are some key points in the course of World War Two that Hitler took charge of and made decisions against the Foreign Ministry’s ideas. It is persuasive in convincing readers that Hitler was mostly led through foreign policy by his ministers. There is no way to know whether anything different would have changed the outcome of World War Two. |
Bibliography and Links (back to top)(links last checked 3/x/07)
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Any student tempted to use this paper for an assignment in another course or school should be aware of the serious consequences for plagiarism. Here is what I write in my syllabi:
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