Book Essay (back
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Conflicting
Blueprints:
The Different
Polices for Rebuilding Germany after WW II
May 8, 1945 was the day that World War II ended for Germany.
The defeat of the Nazis created a power vacuum within Germany that the
victorious Allies were forced to fill. What did the Western Allies, the
U.S.S.R., and the German people wish for their country after the war?
Renata Fritsch-Bournazel’s book Confronting the German Question: Germans
on the East-West Divide is a great book for answering the question
of what direction the Germans wished to take after the war. While Edgar
McInnis’ The Shaping of Postwar Germany does a good job of answering
what the Allies wished to do with their occupied zones. The different
ideologies of the Allies as well as Germany’s desire to be seen as peaceful
led to many different views and policies for this war-torn country. A
lot of times these policies were as much an attempt to solve the question
of Germany as they were another avenue for the east and west to push forward
their conflicting ideologies.
During World War II the goals of the Western Allies and the Soviet Union
were one and the same. They all agreed that their first goal should be
to defeat Germany, occupy it militarily and liberate the peoples in the
occupied territories. Their second goal was to destroy National Socialism
and create conditions in Germany so that it could never rise again. Each
side, whether it be capitalist or communist felt that way was the right
way to achieve this goal. Ironically both sides were willing to risk war
for the sake of their brand of peace. Unfortunately for Germany the two
postwar states would be stuck in the middle of this clash of visions for
decades to come.
Reparations
The first conflict between the former allies came at the Yalta conference,
where disagreements over Soviet reparations, where Poland’s western border
should lie and the postwar political structure of Germany were the first
points of contention.
The reparations that Stalin sought for his country were seen by the Western
powers as too much for Germany to handle. The initial sum that the U.S.S.R.
wished to extract from Germany was $10 Billion or $215 million a year
for 50 years. The west feared this sum would leave the Germans starving.
The disagreement over war reparations continued until July of 1945 at
the Potsdam Conference. It was decided at this conference that reparations
would be settled by zone, with each country taking what it needed out
of its own area of control. The Soviets were quick to take what they wanted,
“stripping their own zone of half its industrial plant” and then confiscating
“for reparations the bulk of the production from what was left” (McInnis
pg.30). It is in this action that we can see that one of the main goals
of the U.S.S.R. for post-war Germany was to extract what it felt it deserved
from its zone.
The Western Allies, specifically the U.S. and Britain, were more concerned
with the rebuilding of Germany than with reparations. Once they realized
that the country was not recovering economically in the face of the Allied
reparations plan they changed their focus from getting what they wanted
out of Germany to helping it. They ended up giving Germany economic aid
in the hope that it would help the country get back on its feet. McInnis
claims that “by 1947 the United States and Britain found themselves compelled
to pour subsidies into their sectors of occupied Germany to the tune of
$700 million a year”(pg.31). The Western powers, much more than the East,
seemed to grasp the fact that an economically weak Germany would hurt
Europe as a whole, and changed their policies accordingly.
An added bonus for the west was that a financially secure West Germany
would be less susceptible to the lure of communism. Which would in turn
give the West a important ally very close to the iron curtain.
Borders
Another difference between the West and East was over the issue of territory.
While they all agreed that Germany would not retain anything beyond her
1937 borders the U.S.S.R. was particularly adamant about what they wanted
to happen to the East German border. Specifically whether the Polish border
should be pushed westward or not. Stalin wished to expand the border to
the west of the Oder-Neisse line but the western allies felt that the
German-speaking peoples of the region should remain part of Germany. The
Allies realized that since much of the territory in question was already
occupied by the Russians and Poles it would be hard to fight Stalin on
this issue. A deal was struck with the U.S.S.R. The Western powers agreed
to the expansion of Poland’s northern and western borders as long as the
government established in Poland was independent and democratic.
The issue of the Polish-German border was brought up again at the Potsdam
Conference. During this conference no official agreement was made on the
border of these countries. Instead it was decided that a deportation of
the German peoples along the Polish, Czechoslovakian, and Hungarian borders
was necessary to solve some of these border disputes. In total 11.7 million
Germans were moved west into Germany.
The border dispute between Poland and Germany is important because it
helps to demonstrate the Soviet goals. They wished to expand and strengthen
their Communist empire and saw this as an opportunity to do just that.
Political Rebuilding
Probably one of the most important differences between the West and the
East is how they wished to politically structure their respective parts
of Germany. All sides agreed that it might be to benefit to “break into
separate pieces the state whose centralization under Hitler’s supreme
authority had helped to make her so formidable a menace” (McInnis pg.44).
To what extent these pieces should be politically connected and how was
a subject for debate. Both sides feared that the other was trying to establish
its respective ideology in the new German government. As a result no unified
German government was created. By 1949 the debate had become a non-issue.
The establishment of the German Democratic Republic in the east and the
German Federal Republic in the west allowed each side to mold a piece
of Germany in its own image.
The communists were very aggressive in the establishment of political
goals in their occupied zones. Before the war had even ended a group of
German communists were flown into eastern Germany to help create the government.
Under these communists the KPD party was founded and quickly became the
dominant political party of East Germany. When the GDR was founded in
1949, the SED since 1946 was its main party with all the others being
weak and under the sway of the communists. In the years following the
founding of the GDR it was to slowly erode its veil of democracy and be
seen as the communist government that it really was.
The West on the other hand handled the political rebuilding of West Germany
quite differently than the Soviets. McInnis says, “ while the Allies at
the outset assumed comprehensive political authority, it was not their
plan to shoulder the burden of detailed administration. That was to be
carried out through the Germans themselves as soon as competent and trustworthy
officials could be installed”(pg. 14). What McInnis is saying here is
that the Western allies did not wish to rule Germany, at least not permanently,
but rather help it along towards the creation of its own government. This
is in stark contrast to the Soviets who allowed the country some autonomy
but kept their influence strong within the government.
One of the ways that the Western allies helped Germany down the democratic
path was to create democratic institutions at the local level. In this
way the Allies allowed for the German people to experience democracy without
giving them too much responsibility before they were ready. The Allies
feared that immediate democratic authority to the German people could
lead to the election of tyrants like Hitler and felt that a “ cooling-off
period that would allow the emotions of vengeance to subside and a more
objective attitude to emerge” (McInnis pg. 15).
Another challenge that the Allies had to handle in postwar Germany was
the denazification of the country. In order to accomplish this Germany
had to be
cleansed of Nazis, that those guilty of sustaining Nazi rule must
be punished, and that it was essential, if future peace was to be secured,
that Germans should be convinced of the error of Nazi views and persuaded
to assent to more democratic and peaceful values. (Fulbrook p. 141)
Denazification
Like many other things, the Western Allies and the Soviets had different
views on how to accomplish this task. The Soviets were very structured
on their denazification polices. They were most concerned with removing
Nazis from political office, administrative spheres, judiciary posts and
teaching positions. Nazis who specialized in areas of medicine were more
often left to their positions because of their usefulness in post-war
Germany. The Soviets set out early on to distinguish between the real
Nazis and those that were just following orders. They amnestied minor
Nazis so as to help them build the new communist state. They also put
a lot of effort into changing the curriculum at schools. German schools
during World War II taught Nazi propaganda. The Communists changed the
curriculum to Marxist-Leninist teachings.
The West, on the other hand, had a harder time with denazification. The
Western allies were torn over what it meant to be a Nazi. It couldn’t
simply be party membership because there were many who joined the party
for their own safety or to keep their job. The Western allies also were
torn over what to do with Nazis once they decided who they were. Was rehabilitation
or punishment the goal for these former foes? This hesitation and confusion
over what to do with former Nazis continued to be a problem for the West
for many years after the war.
With all this talk about the polices of the great powers it is easy to
forget that behind all this is a nation of people that were being affected
by decisions made for them. One of the main fears of the German people
was the possibility of war between the Western powers and the U.S.S.R.
A German intellectual named Rudolf Bahro summed up this fear in his writings.
He stated that “This frontier between the two blocs and the concentration
of destructive power on both sides of it–this is what in a crisis would
turn our country, before an other in Europe, into a shooting range for
the two superpowers (Fritsch-Bournazel pg. 20). This is a fear that the
already war-weary German people had after World War Two, especially with
the increased tensions of the Cold War.
Many Germans felt that the only way to stop the threat of a war on their
countries soil was to reunite. Author such as Wolfgang Venohr argued that
because of the importance a united Germany has to peace it is not just
an issue for the Germans to worry about, but all of mankind. In his book
Die deutsche Einheit kommt bestimmt (German unity must come)
he paints a grave ultimatum for the world, “Either it will come through
military catastrophe, in which case the reunification of all Germans will
be in a mass grave. Or it will come through a political solution” (Fritsch-Bournazel
pg. 20).
Whether these arguments of a nuclear holocaust on German soil were likely
is questionable. In an age of mutualy assured destruction a war between
the Western powers and the U.S.S.R. would not only be a danger to Germans
but to the rest of the world as well.
The German opposition to nuclear weapons goes beyond a fear for themselves.
Fritsch-Bournazel explains that there is a great guilt among the Germans
for being the aggressors in both of the World Wars. As a result many Germans
feel that it is their duty to be a nation that pushes for peace (pg 21).
In 1983 Gert Bastian, a former General of the West German army, made a
speech in Hamburg on this very subject. In this speech he says “I believe
that no other country in the world, certainly not one in Europe, can be
more conscious than the Germans of their special responsibility for peace
and for promoting such a step, a responsibility derived from history and
from their own past errors and mistakes” (Fritsch-Bournazel pg.21).
There are also those in the German peace movement who see the Allied
powers not as liberators but as occupiers. That is not to say that these
people wish that the Nazis were still in power, rather they see the Allies
as the main roadblock to peace in Germany. For example many Germans opposed
the U.S. when they stationed Pershing-II missiles on German soil in 1983.
Many Germans felt that these missiles represented the “FRG’s lack of
sovereignty on issues of international security policy” (Fritsch-Bournazel
pg.22). They feared that war was going to be forced upon them by the tension
between the occupying countries.
The peace movement prevalent in post-war Germany was not an anomaly.
Germany to this day is still very hesitant about fighting in or supporting
wars. Staunch opposition to the current Iraq war is a great example of
this. I believe that the post-world war Germans within the peace movement
above all else wished for peace. Their guilt over World War II along with
the weariness they felt over fighting two major wars in one century was
the cause of this change.
The Allied powers also wished for peace and felt that what they did with
Germany after the war was a key part of that. Unfortunately problems arose
when their views on how to reach this peace conflicted. The disagreements
seen in the Cold War often had great influence on Germany and its two
governments. Regrettably for Germany’s people its governments would not
be free of this influence until the fall of the Soviet Union. |
